Data on how abundance of resource inflows and punishment types affect resource extraction behavior

Abstract

The data is collected through laboratory experiments on a dynamic common pool resource game, where, in an infinitely repeated number of rounds (i.e., game ended randomly), individuals made decisions about whether to exert a high or a low effort level to extract resources. Experiments were conducted using the student sample (consent provided and ethics approved) at the University of Hawaiʻi at Mānoa. A total of 8 sessions, 2 for each of the 4 treatments, were run with exactly 20 participants within a session. Individuals made decisions in groups of 10. Communication between any participant was not allowed. A session is randomly assigned (1) to vary whether the inflow of resources at the beginning of each round is high or low, and (2) to allow participants to either financially punish or socially punish defectors. A financial punishment resulted to a loss in profit for the punished while a social punishment displayed the words “You have extracted too much! You're being greedy!” on the computer screen of the punished. Individuals were assigned subject ID numbers and interacted using their subject IDs. The data is useful in understanding how resource inflow and type of punishment affects individual resource extraction behavior. The data could also be combined with other publicly available common pool resource datasets for a meta-analysis on individual behavior in the commons.

Keywords

• Resource curse
• Common pool resources
• Social ostracism
• Financial Punishment