Hic sunt impossibilia. Odradek e altri oggetti non convenzionali

Abstract

The topic of this article is to develop an alternative, ontologically settled, problematic intuition about how to establish theoretical criteria of (non) conceptuality of an intentional content which kind of properties must an object possess to be able to furnish a full formal satisfaction to a conceptualization process? Are there any objects upon which our concepts can only go in vain in a sort of non conceptual short circuit’s breakdown in the very same act, in order to be caught in a perceptual process? To give one or more answers to these questions, the article analyzes some examples of thing which are very difficult to conceive immediate y by means of predicative concept, the so -called Odradek object (O/o),taking inspiration by the case of a Kafka’ s famous tale character .It is possible to show the existence of almost a odd phenomenon of optical illusion in which the behaviour of perceptual structure of certain objects is very clear y similar to an O/o s one (Frisby’s effect in the Waterfall illusion, for example). Nevertheless, conclusions of the article will show how the reasons to believe in the plausibility of this hypothesis are more a priori and conceptually based than psychologically and experimentally inspired.