Russian Journal of Economics and Law (Sep 2014)
Authorizing parliamentary control in the system of powers separation
Abstract
Objective: to determine the degree of influence of the party system on the powers separation by using analysis of implementation of authorizing parliamentary control in the countries with different governmental forms (presidential, mixed, parliamentary republic, parliamentary monarchy). Methods: historical, comparative, formal-legal and statistical methods. Results: Basing on the study of legal and factual sides of parliamentary control in the Federal Republic of Germany (parliamentary republic), the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (parliamentary monarchy), the Republic of Italy (parliamentary republic), the United States (presidential republic), Republic of Korea (presidential republic), Lithuania (mixed republic), the author proves the existence of large distortion in the power separation in practice. Scientific novelty: It is revealed that mechanisms of interaction between parliaments and governments in the so-called leading democracies differ from those provided for in their Constitutions. In particular, though there are constitutional norms of the government responsibility in parliamentary republics, monarchies, and mixed republics, as well as the impeachment of the President in presidential republics, these institutions are actually never applied in practice. Primarily, this is due to the fact that the ruling parties, especially in parliamentary countries with a stable party system, actually belong to both legislative and executive powers, which significantly distorts the legally enshrined separation of powers (for example, in the UK, Germany). In the countries with underdeveloped or unstable party system (Republic of Korea, Lithuania), on the contrary, the probability of the authorizing parliamentary control increases, especially if the President loses the support of the parliamentary majority. Practical value: The ability to optimize public administration in Russia.
