Formalizing Attack Tree on Security Object for MySANi in Legal Metrology

Abstract

Illegal software manipulation is one of the biggest issues in software security. This includes the legally relevant software which are now crucial modules in weight and measuring instruments such as weighbridges. Despite the advancement and complexity of weight and measuring instruments, the inspection methodology is weak and lacks of innovation. The conventional inspection method is merely based on the observation printed certificate of the software. This paper introduces Malaysia Software-Assisted Non-Automatic Weighing Instrument (NAWI) Inspection (MySANI), a method used to enhance the software inspection scheme in legal metrology. MySANI introduces security objects in order to assist and enhance the inspection process. The security evaluation is based on the best practices in IT in metrology, where the attack model on relevant assets of the security objects is simulated for the Attack Probability Tree. The attack tree is verified by integrating formal notation and comparison with finite state transition system domain to verify the correctness properties of the tree design before the model can be further used in a risk analysis procedure within the Attack Probability Tree framework. Results show that the designed attack tree is consistent with the designed simulation.

Keywords

• formal model
• specification techniques
• infrastructure protection
• security
• integrity
• law