Philosophy of Information and the Problem of Its Understanding as Philosophia Prima

Abstract

This article first presents the philosophy of information (PI) and the demarcation of its subject in a methodologically comprehensive form, following L. Floridi's conception of PI. In contrast to his proposal, the subject of the metaphilosophy of information is singled out, and the term ‘philosophia prima’ is clarified as well. Floridi claims that his conception of PI can be understood as prima in relation to other philosophical disciplines. However, even twenty years after its introduction, the problem of understanding PI as philosophia prima has not received any significant direct reflection. In this study, the question is answered whether this problem is still an open problem of PI, and if so, in what sense. The thesis that the problem of understanding PI as philosophia prima is an open problem of metaphilosophy of information is defended, while, given the results of work in PI, some areas are identified relative to which we currently can, cannot, and are unable to label PI as prima.

Keywords

• information
• philosophy of information
• metaphilosophy of information
• philosophia prima
• l. floridi