“Platonismo sociale”? In difesa del realismo fenomenologico in ontologia sociale

Abstract

In my paper, I will address two issues on the characterisation of social objects as subject-dependent objects: (i) Does phenomenological realism imply Platonism in social ontology? (ii) Which type of intentionality is the protagonist of social objects’ existential dependence on subjects? Both questions deal with Ferraris’ reception of Reinach’s phenomenological realism, on the one hand, and with the role played by the intentionality of social acts in the constitution of social objects, on the other (Reinach 1913, Ferraris 2009). According to Ferraris, Reinach’s phenomenological realism becomes a sort of “social Platonism”, and the intentionality of social acts is an individual intentionality. On the contrary, I will maintain that phenomenological realism does not imply social Platonism in social ontology, and that social intentionality is not an individual and solitary intentionality: it is, rather, a heterotropic intentionality which necessarily refers to and depends on other subjects.