Information Jamming and Capture Cost: A Global Game Analysis of Collective Action

Abstract

To understand the interactive mechanisms behind citizens’ collective action against the project implementation of local governments of authoritarian regimes, we develop a global game model in which the decisions of local governments, media outlets, and citizens are endogenous. The methodology of theoretical game model focuses on the relationship between media capture and citizens’ belief formation and how it affects the citizens’ decision to participate in a demonstration. Our results show that if the information jamming effect dominates the capture cost effect, then increasing the supervision efficiency of media helps local governments implement unpopular projects that bring negative externalities to citizens. Otherwise, increasing the supervision efficiency would make it more difficult for local governments to implement projects. Based on the results of game model, policies such as relaxing media control, developing the media market, strengthening the judicial system, and perfecting the information disclosure system of local governments could increase the cost of media capture and thus effectively constrain the behavior of local governments, which helps prevent the occurrence of mass disturbances.