Secure the IoT Networks as Epidemic Containment Game

Abstract

The spread of a computer virus among the Internet of Things (IoT) devices can be modeled as an Epidemic Containment (EC) game, where each owner decides the strategy, e.g., installing anti-virus software, to maximize his utility against the susceptible-infected-susceptible (SIS) model of the epidemics on graphs. The EC game’s canonical solution concepts are the Minimum/Maximum Nash Equilibria (MinNE/MaxNE). However, computing the exact MinNE/MaxNE is NP-hard, and only several heuristic algorithms are proposed to approximate the MinNE/MaxNE. To calculate the exact MinNE/MaxNE, we provide a thorough analysis of some special graphs and propose scalable and exact algorithms for general graphs. Especially, our contributions are four-fold. First, we analytically give the MinNE/MaxNE for EC on special graphs based on spectral radius. Second, we provide an integer linear programming formulation (ILP) to determine MinNE/MaxNE for the general graphs with the small epidemic threshold. Third, we propose a branch-and-bound (BnB) framework to compute the exact MinNE/MaxNE in the general graphs with several heuristic methods to branch the variables. Fourth, we adopt NetShiled (NetS) method to approximate the MinNE to improve the scalability. Extensive experiments demonstrate that our BnB algorithm can outperform the naive enumeration method in scalability, and the NetS can improve the scalability significantly and outperform the previous heuristic method in solution quality.

Keywords

• cyber-security
• epidemic control
• game theory
• complex network