Los frenos del poder (Una introducción al principio de separación de poderes y al control de las instituciones en los sistemas constitucionales)

Abstract

This work is and introduction to a study entitled ¿The brakes to power (separation of powers and control of the institutions in constitutional systems)¿ which will see the light soon. In this introduction it is directly suggested that two great conceptions of understanding the separation of powers exist. The first one, based on the idea of balance (or ¿check and balances¿) is of anglosaxon origin but it only became ingrained in the United States, whereas England did separate from that original model that it had supported. The second one has its origin in the French Revolution where a formal application of the principle of separation of powers took place, but that in the practice it always meant a control of one power over the others. The consequences of this different comprehension of the principle of separation of powers did project on the systems of institutional control, resulting in two great models, although with three variants. In this work the basic elements of this evolution are drawn by means of the role played by political parties in the design of the institutional system of controlling the power, the particular role that will achieve the constitutional jurisdiction across Europe as a mean of addressing the lacks and the multiplication of bodies of control and regulation as means (many times formal and not sufficient) of controlling the power.

Keywords

• constitutional organization of power
• constitutionalism
• control over institutions
• executive power
• judicial power
• legislative power
• separation of powers
• theory of the constitution