Comparative Theology (Dec 2013)
The Distinction Between the Essence and Reality of Religion: Resolving an Ambiguity in the Method of Phenomenology of Religion
Abstract
During recent centuries, under the influence of modern and postmodern ideas, religious studies have been exposed to new approaches and views. On the one hand, these approaches are not an extension of theology in the traditional sense and on the other hand, they give a remarkable role to method in religious studies. The importance of phenomenology and the eyes it has caught as a "method" in study of religion, as well as in such disciplines as philosophy of religion, sociology of religion, psychology of religion, history of religion and so on, have been due to the compatibility of this method or approach with different religions and as a result due to preparing the ground for comparative studies of religions, on the one hand, and because of being descriptive and non-judicative about beliefs and thoughts, on the other. Historically speaking, this method or approach is a product of the mixture of two intellectual currents in the nineteenth century west. These two currents comprise scientific research of religion and the philosophical phenomenology of the German philosopher, "Edmund Husserl". As compared to philosophical phenomenology, phenomenology of religion has undergone through dramatic changes in all its aspects. But we can't understand phenomenology of religion, particularly in the twentieth century, apart from philosophical phenomenology, specifically Husserl's phenomenology and its important concepts. However, there are two challenging problems in phenomenology of religion both historically and regarding its essential complexity as such: first, the existing variety of phenomenologies of religion in Rudolf Otto, Mircea Eliade, Max scheler, C. Jouco bleeker, Ninian Smart, Gerardus van der Leeuw and many others works has hardened the process of understanding of this method and thus it seems necessary to outline the underlying characteristics of this method. The second and more significant point is that the works of early phenomenologists of religion like Chantepie de la Saussaye and Raffaele Pettazzoni, took form as a rival or complement for "religions history" and for reaching the essence of various historical-experimental phenomena of religion; But by the dawn of twentieth century and the interactions occurred between phenomenology of religion and philosophical phenomenology, especially Husserl`s phenomenology, the project of reaching the essence of phenomena got mixed with the problem of "reality" of religion. This ambiguity has its origin in the fact that the subject-matter of both phenomenology and traditional theology –Kalam in Islam- is religion; phenomenology of religion claims that in contrast with history of religions, it is to reach the "essence" of religion or religious phenomena, while traditional theology considers the essential "reality" of religion as its subject. Therefore, we have sought to account for three points : 1. recounting the underlying characteristics of phenomenologies of religion in the twentieth century 2. explaining the distinction between the essence and reality of religion in phenomenology 3. explaining the substantive difference between intersubjective reality of religion in phenomenology of religion and the essential reality of religion in traditional theological studies. To this end, first, Husserl's phenomenology needs to be explained based on its fundamental concepts. Edmund Husserl, influenced by Brentano's "descriptive psychology" and in respond to "crisis of european science", brackets natural approach to the universe, and shifts the subject of philosophy from the external/objective existence of universe to knowledge phenomena. Simultaneous to this bracketing, a “phenomenological reduction” occurs and philosophy changes into phenomenology. After this stage, the only thing that is available for the subject is consciousness phenomena which has intentional characteristic. Considering intentional characteristic, there is no pure consciousness and always consciousness is “consciousness of something”. Therefore, consciousness is product of ratio between “Noesis” (that is “experience of and attention to object of consciousness) and “Noema” (that is “content of experience” or “object of intention” or “belonging of consciousness”). After the stage of epoche, subject, in stage of "eidetic reduction", descript phenomena –as the matter of knowledge- makes them unequivocal and ideates simultaneously. The main point is that in this stage, what is constituted as essence is wholly different from objective and external reality of religion. Husserl, in stage of “transcendental reduction”, shifts the subject to phenomenological world. Considering the intentional character of consciousness, every subject notices others in an intentional fashion, and I through a sympathetic procedure they try to make intersubjective reality in external world. But the phenomenologists of religion, influenced by Husserl`s phenomenology and principle of epoche, bracket the objectivist perspective of traditional theology of reality and suffice to subjective perspective. Unlike Husserl who emphasized on rational meditations in eidetic reduction, they stress empirically on “eidetic vision” and intuit historical and empirical phenomena of religion. Therefore, in this stage, they decode religious phenomena. The outcome of this stage is the uncovering of essence of religion, not that of the reality of religion. Moreover, phenomenologists of religion do not pay much attention to transcendental reduction and instead they prefer to be more concentrated on the principle of "sympathy" in the procedure of invention of intersubjective reality. Musing on religious phenomena, phenomenologist imagines that other believers have religious consciousness and experiences like those ones he himself has. S/he tries to constitute the reality of religion by sympathizing with other believers. Due to the intentional character of religious consciousness, phenomenologist has to pay attention to other phenomenologists and believers; the believers and other believing minds who are conscious of religious phenomena and experiences like me. Substantively, the reality which is explained here by phenomenologists is not semantically alike with the account provided by theologians. The noumenal reality of religion which has already been bracketed is no way dependent on desires, requires and nature of human subject consciousness, while intersubjective reality of religion is completely contingent upon variable human subjects. The criterion of authenticity and correctness of religious propositions and theorems, then, is not hinged on their correspondence with the noumenal reality, but is a matter of life-world and common sense of believers.
