Russian institutional learning and regional peace operations: the cases of Georgia and Moldova

Abstract

This article examines Russia’s behaviour towards intra-state conflict in its immediate regional space since the early 1990s. Existing scholarship largely attributes Russia’s approach to being a mere extension of its principal security logic based on the promotion of regional hegemonic interests. While these interests cannot be ignored, this article proposes that Russia’s lack of institutional learning in doctrine and practice of peace operations has also been a central, yet neglected determinant shaping its response towards the conflicts. This, it is argued, is embedded in a persuasive sub-set of secondary security logics predicated on legitimate concerns of regional stability and security. This analysis is based on an interrogation of the regional conflicts in Georgia and Moldova as they provide the most informative cases into Russia’s experience of peace operations. The article concludes with some brief comments on the current crisis in Ukraine and how this relates to Russia’s response towards regional intra-state conflict.

Keywords

• Rusia, operaciones de paz, aprendizaje institucional, conflictos congelados, lógica de seguridad