A metáfora do cálculo no período intermediário de Wittgenstein

Abstract

This paper investigates some uses of the metaphor of language as a calculus in Wittgenstein. The calculus metaphor emerges in the 1930s in a dialogue with the referentialist, and is instrumental on the turning of the philosophical attention towards the extant uses of linguistic symbolism. However, it has gone too far, by suggesting an image of language as composed only of inferences in the manner of the closed systems of rules. This would hinder a pragmatic expansion of the criterial context of conceptual analysis. The metaphor will be reactivated in latter manuscripts, whenever it can serve the same purposes of its inception in the intermediary period, as the dialogic scenes invoke new, dogmatically referentialist voices. Still, it is in the intermediate manuscripts that its operation can be best understood. Finally, such movement exemplifies a philosophical method which doesn’t proceed through the overcoming of problems in a scientific fashion.

Keywords

• Rules
• Calculus
• Analysis
• Use
• Wittgenstein
• Pragmactics