Structure de propriété et partage de la valeur ajoutée : application aux entreprises françaises non financières du SBF120
Abstract
Conflicts of interests between employees and shareholders mainly arise during the distribution of the value added since each party tends to maximize its share at the expense of the other. The objective of this paper is to determine, according to the firm’s ownership structure, whether employees’ rights would affect the distribution of the value added. Using a sample of 84 large French companies during the period 2000-2005, our study shows that the number of signed agreements between the company and employees’ representatives positively affects the share of wealth allocated to employees. Also, we find that the number of employees’ representatives benefits the shareholders in particular within companies with dispersed ownership. The extent of layoffs improves shareholders’ value-added and reduces the part distributed to employees in companies with higher ownership concentration. Ownership structure thus affects the balance of power between employees and shareholders.
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