The foundations of I. Kant’s and V. Solovyov’s moral philosophies

Abstract

The grounds of construction of ethical systems of Kant and Solovjev are comparatively tested in this article. Noting the obvious strenghts of Kant’s ethics, Solovjev finds, that because of its absolute formalism it doesn’t have the complete implementation in the objective world. Solovjev also sees as unsuccessful Kant’s attempt at overcoming subjectivism in the moral sphere. In Solovjev’s opinion, Kant’s postulates of practical reason don’t overcome subjectivism, but bring to the foundation of Kant’s ethic the double meaning and uncertainty. The author notes, that for all his respect to Kant’s ethic, Russian philosopher constructs ethic on his own principles. In the foundation of his moral philosophy Solovjev puts down the idea of Good, characterizing it as lawful, autonomous and all-united (vseedinoje). Solovjev proposes to regard the feelings of shame, pity and reverence as the primary data of human moral, disregarding the warnings of Kant about the unacceptability of natural foundations for our morals. Such distinction in the primary data of human moral of the concerned authors reposes on distinction in appraisal of human primary nature: Kant considers it as evil, Solovjev — as good. Thus, in contrast to I. Kant V. Solovjev affirms the heteronomy of morals and its religiousness, which, however, has little in common with Christianity.

Keywords

• ethics
• morals
• religion
• I. Kant
• Vl. Solovyov
• critical philosophy
• philosophy of all-unity