Le menti non sono documenti (e viceversa)

Abstract

In the theory of documentality, social objects are understood as inscribed acts; in extended mind theory, minds are considered to extend beyond the body to external processes and devices. Although for different reasons, these two theories rely on the semiotic dimension to reduce the differences between minds and documents. Yet, in a certain reading, such theories are implausible if we consider that the properties of the things we call “minds” are not identical to the properties of the things we call “documents” (just as, on the other hand, the properties of social objects are not identical to the properties of the acts that constitute them). This calls into question a common thesis implicit in both theories: that moderate or interactionist externalism can be used to challenge strong externalism.

Keywords

• law
• documents
• extended mind
• externalism
• social objects
• social ontology
• maurizio ferraris