Constructing the Pyramid of Influence: Informal Institutions as Building Blocks of Judicial Oligarchy in Georgia

Abstract

This Article gives a cautionary account of the rise of judicial oligarchs in Georgia, highlighting how their rule distorts judicial governance and undermines judicial independence. The Georgian judiciary is portrayed as a pyramid-like structure where judges’ positions are determined by their influence on judicial governance and decision-making. Judicial oligarchs are a select few judges at the top that have acquired system-wide influence over the judiciary through their trusted affiliates, leaving other judges with minimal influence at the bottom of the pyramid. Research indicates that judicial self-governance bodies, such as judicial councils, can easily be manipulated by a handful of judges independently or through collusion with politicians. This can occur especially when most judges have little interest and the ability to participate meaningfully in governance. The Article explains how judicial oligarchs get judges to elect them and their affiliates as judicial council members. Informal networks and institutions contribute to their electoral success. There appears to be a shared expectation that judges will not challenge the oligarchs’ authority by publicly disagreeing with them or competing with them in elections, or else face sanctions. Research also cautions that de-politicization in the sense of excluding politicians from the bodies of judicial governance will not necessarily prevent politicians’ informal meddling with judicial decision-making. Collusion between judicial oligarchs and ruling party politicians forms part of the broader strategy of weakening the checks and balances and allowing the ruling party to operate without constraints. Thus, judicial oligarchs help to perpetuate oligarchization in the political sphere.

Keywords

• Oligarchization of Judicial Governance
• informal judicial institutions
• Post-Soviet judiciaries
• judicial assertiveness
• judicial capture