On the Embodiment of Social Cognition Skills: The Inner and Outer Body Processing Differently Contributes to the Affective and Cognitive Theory of Mind

Abstract

A specific interpretation of embodiment assigns a central role to the body representations (BR) in cognition. In the social cognition domain, BR could be pivotal in representing others’ actions and states. However, empirical evidence on the relationship between different BR and social cognition, in terms of Theory of Mind (ToM), in the same sample of participants is missing. Here, this relationship was explored considering individual differences in the action-oriented BR (aBR), nonaction-oriented BR (NaBR), and subjective predisposition toward internal bodily sensations (interoceptive sensibility, ISe). Eighty-two healthy adults were given behavioral measures probing aBR, NaBR, ISe, and affective/cognitive ToM. The results suggest that NaBR, which mainly relies on exteroceptive signals, predicts individual differences in cognitive ToM, possibly because it can allow differentiating between the self and others. Instead, the negative association between affective ToM and ISe suggests that an alteration of the internal body state representation (i.e., over-reporting interoceptive sensations) can affect emotional processing in social contexts. The finding that distinct aspects of the body processing from within (ISe) and from the outside (NaBR) differently contribute to ToM provides empirical support to the BR role in social cognition and can be relevant for developing interventions in clinical settings.

Keywords

• social cognition
• theory of mind
• embodiment
• embodied cognition
• interoception
• interoceptive sensibility