Leadership turnover, winning coalition size and foreign policy realignment

Abstract

Abstract Why do states realign their foreign policies toward a major power? Conventional wisdom holds that change in political leadership tends to result in less drastic foreign policy realignment in countries with large winning coalitions. The current study capitalizes on this conventional wisdom by invoking a key insight of the selectorate theory, the non-linear welfare function. Since the welfare of coalition members falls before it rises as the size of winning coalition becomes larger, one should expect the stabilizing effects of winning coalitions to be the weakest for low-to-medium sized winning coalitions. Thus, leadership turnover in countries with middle-sized winning coalitions is expected to result in greater foreign policy realignment than in countries with very large or very small coalitions. We test this theoretical proposition by studying the foreign policies of 154 countries towards China from 1972 to 2015. With newly constructed measures of leadership turnover and winning coalitions size, the evidence supports a non-linear relationship between change in leadership and foreign policy realignment along the continuum of winning coalition size.

Keywords

• Foreign policy
• Leadership turnover
• Winning coalition size
• Selectorate theory
• China