The presidency of the Budget Committee and their influence in the geographical distribution of the budget

Abstract

The literature about the role and influence of the Congress in the policymaking process identify this institution as a marginal actor in this process. Reasons of this include low institutionalization or limited technical capacity. On the other side, the executive has been considered a dominant player and the technocracy within economic institutions has been characterized as a strong or powerful actor. Nevertheless, it is possible to identify a lack of empirical studies that measure this influence, in order to test if it is as low as it has been described. The present study faces this absence with the analysis of Congress´s influence on budget approval, specifically in the geographical distribution. The methodology consists of a comparison of the allocations of the budget bill with the ones of the budget law, identifying variations. The hypothesis tested here is that the President of the Budget Committee has a considerable influence that explains their superior success in the search and competition for more resources for their region.