Il pendolo del "federalismo all'italiana" e la proposta di riforma costituzionale del governo Renzi

Abstract

The paper provides a key to understanding the regulatory and legal affairs of the Italian regionalism with particular reference to the constitutional reform of 2001 and the project of constitutional reform under consideration in Parliament in 2015. The essay uses the figure of the pendulum that is the instrument that can position between two extremes: local autonomy and centralized state. Italian regionalism in recent years has positioned itself, just like a pendulum, on several points, but always with swings that have given very few elements of stability to the system. Especially the paper examines the evolution of regional autonomy both from the formal point of view (the Constitution) and substantive (the constitutional jurisprudence and institutional application). Today the Italian regions seem to undergo a double process of erosion of skills: on the one hand the increasing role of the European Union and the budgetary constraints and the resulting strengthening of the powers of the State, the other the strengthening of metropolitan cities. We can say that after a short period of reforms that have strengthened the regional autonomy policy, over the past 5 years, the path is completely opposite and, if it is approved the constitutional reform, the Italian regions will lose much of their autonomy. The paper aims to highlight some structural factors that have weakened the Italian regionalism which, for example, the small size and population of the local authorities. In addition, after the constitutional reform of 2001 only a few regions have tried to adopt laws in the areas of new jurisdiction, while many regions have continued to plan its activities primarily as administrative activity and have given up their role as legislators.

Keywords

• Italian regionalism
• federalism
• European integration
• public spending control