Primordial experiential grounding for metaphorisation

Abstract

In view of the embodiment hypothesis, a question arises as to what degree embodiment influences language, that is, what is the experiential basis of metaphorical language. This question has so far remained unresolved. A fundamental distinction in our existence is the division into the physical and abstract worlds. The physical world is the world of physical objects. An analysis of abstract concepts (it is THOUGHT in the present paper) shows that the ultimate, primeval experiential basis (source domain) is the world of physical objects. The distinction between the worlds of physical objects and abstract entities is the basis of a new typology of metaphors based on the hypothesis that the object schema is the primeval and ultimate source domain (experiential basis), not subject to any further metaphorization. Such a thesis allows also to formulate suggestions as to the development of the abstract thinking in general.

Keywords

• experiential basis of metaphorization
• objectivisation
• primary source domain
• phylogenetic development of metaphorization