Detection of Cyber Attacks on Voltage Regulation in Distribution Systems Using Machine Learning

Abstract

Several wired and wireless advanced communication technologies have been used for coordinated voltage regulation schemes in distribution systems. These technologies have been employed to both receive voltage measurements from field sensors and transmit control settings to voltage regulating devices (VRDs). Communication networks for voltage regulation can be susceptible to data falsification attacks, which can lead to voltage instability. In this context, an attacker can alter multiple field measurements in a coordinated manner to disturb voltage control algorithms. This paper proposes a machine learning-based two-stage approach to detect, locate, and distinguish coordinated data falsification attacks on control systems of coordinated voltage regulation schemes in distribution systems with distributed generators. In the first stage (regression), historical voltage measurements along with current meteorological data (solar irradiance and ambient temperature) are provided to random forest regressor to forecast voltage magnitudes of a given current state. In the second stage, a logistic regression compares the forecasted voltage with the measured voltage (used to set VRDs) to detect, locate, and distinguish coordinated data falsification attacks in real-time. The proposed approach is validated through several case studies on a 240-node real distribution system (based in the USA) and the standard IEEE 123-node benchmark distribution system. The results show that the proposed approach can detect low margin attacks (as low as 1% of actual measurements) with up to 99% accuracy. All of the developed source codes of the proposed solution are publicly available at Github. https://github.com/nbhusal/Data-Attack-on-Voltage-Regulation.

Keywords

• Coordinated control of voltage regulation
• data falsification cyber attack
• machine learning
• photovoltaic