Mathematics (Feb 2024)

Emission Reduction Decisions in Blockchain-Enabled Low-Carbon Supply Chains under Different Power Structures

  • Manman Jiang,
  • Liping Qin,
  • Wenjin Zuo,
  • Qiang Hu

DOI
https://doi.org/10.3390/math12050704
Journal volume & issue
Vol. 12, no. 5
p. 704

Abstract

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With the global climate problem becoming increasingly severe, governments have adopted policies to encourage enterprises to invest in low-carbon technologies. However, the opacity of the carbon emission reduction process leads to incomplete consumer trust in low-carbon products as well as higher supply chain transaction costs. Based on this, this paper constructs Stackelberg game models with and without blockchain under different power structures and compares the impact of these models on low-carbon emission reduction decisions. The results show that: (1) blockchain does not necessarily improve enterprise profits and can only help enterprises maintain optimal profits within a certain range when the carbon emission cost is low; (2) when consumers’ environmental awareness is high, the blockchain can incentivize manufacturers to enhance carbon emission reduction, and it has an obvious promotional effect on retailers’ profits; and (3) the profit gap between enterprises in the supply chain is larger under different power structures, and the implementation of blockchain can coordinate profit distribution and narrow the gap between enterprises. Compared with the manufacturer-dominated model, the emission reduction in products is maximized under the retailer-dominated model. Our study provides theoretical support for the government to regulate greenhouse gas emissions as well as for the optimization of enterprises’ decision-making supported by blockchain.

Keywords