Managing disclosure outcomes in intelligence interviews

Abstract

We introduce the disclosure-outcomes management model. The model views disclosure in intelligence interviews as a behaviour interviewees use to profitably navigate self-interest dilemmas. We theorized that interviewees compare the potential outcomes of disclosing to their self-interests. They evaluate the extent to which disclosure will facilitate or impede those self-interests: an interviewee’s self-interest dilemma elicits cooperation with respect to some information but not other information. A Preliminary Study (N = 300) supported the model’s predictions. We proposed a Replication Study (N = 369) to examine the model further. Participants assumed the role of an intelligence source undergoing an interview. They decided what information to disclose, contending the typical dilemma in an intelligence interview wherein disclosure could jeopardize or advance their self-interests. The results from the Preliminary and Replication studies were broadly in line with our proposition: perceived benefits positively influenced the likelihood of disclosing. However, a negative interaction between costs and benefits observed in the Preliminary Study did not replicate. That finding may be due to power constraints, not evidence against the existence of an interaction effect. Our proposal that—generally speaking—interviewees are likelier to disclose information units that seem less versus more risky requires further examination. Individual-level sensitivity to benefits, costs and their co-occurrence varied substantially in our studies. We discuss avenues for future research.

Keywords

• disclosure
• intelligence interviewing
• information management
• self-interest dilemma