The Initial Act (On a Neglected Theme in Mikhail Bakhtin’s Moral Philosophy)

Abstract

This article analyzes the moral philosophy (“first philosophy”) of Mikhail Bakhtin (1895–1975) within the boundaries outlined by the draft “Towards a Philosophy of the Act” (early 1920s). It is concluded that the first philosophy is not value-neutral. It sees the world as a unitary and unique being-event, which is determined by the event of the life and death of Christ and is not identical with pure historical factuality. Since (1) the subject of the first philosophy is the world in which the act is performed, (2) the event of the life and death of Christ (according to Bakhtin) irreversibly changed the world, (3) the values of the unique being-event are not correlated in the manuscript with sufficient clarity with the key concepts of the first philosophy, (4) the plan of which was not fully implemented, the article explains the meaning of the first philosophy in the light of the mentioned Christian characteristics of the world. It shows that the values of the world as a unitary and unique being-event (as a whole) are realized through the “initial act”: in such an act, a person recognizes his involvement in the world as a whole, thereby becoming a moral agent (I-for-myself, unique I). Such recognition puts into action the key concepts-realities of the first philosophy — oughtness, responsibility, and the unique place of the self in the world. Accordingly, the article replenishes the meaning of the initial act briefly described in the manuscript by reuniting its “elements” with the meaning and values of the world as a unitary and unique being-event. Based on this study, Bakhtin’s moral philosophy can be characterized as a value ontology and philosophical anthropology in the spirit of Christian personalism.

Keywords

• mikhail bakhtin
• moral philosophy
• world as a whole
• value
• christ
• act
• initial act
• the ought
• responsibility
• unique person