Perfekcionistická kritika liberalizmu verejného rozumu: argumenty liberálnych perfekcionistov

Abstract

The aim of this article is to show from the position of liberal perfectionists that the arguments of public reason liberalism about the unacceptability of perfectionist efforts and controversial positions are unconvincing. In the first part, we will examine the moral respect objection to perfectionism as was formulated by Martha Nussbaum and show that such arguments fail, after which we will introduce a more appropriate, perfectionist conception. In the second part, we will address a more practical question which illustrates well the greater plausibility of the perfectionist position. We will critique an attempt to apply the respect-based argument to perfectionist subsidies, which the leading theorist of liberalism of public reason, Jonathan Quong, has rejected as manipulative. In the third part, we move from these everyday questions of political decision-making to how liberals of public reason use respect in controversial, cultural-ethical issues. Relying on neutral political values is shown to be an unsustainable and illusory solution in the pursuit of equal respect for all. These three lines of argumentation (i.e. theoretical, practical-political and cultural-ethical) will allow us to point out that the project of public reason liberalism brings with it far more problems than its proponents will acknowledge.

Keywords

• public reason liberalism
• perfectionism
• respect
• manipulation
• abortion
• jonathan quong
• matthew kramer
• martha nussbaum