Human dignity and extreme injustice. Different legal-philosophical traditions in dialogue

Abstract

Starting from Macintyre’s idea of «tradition» and Alexy’s thesis that there are conceptions of defense or criticism of practical reason that can be attributed mainly to Aristotle, Hobbes, Kant and Nietzsche, the purpose of this paper is to explore the possibility of a dialogue between these traditions in order to propose reasonable ways of solving some central problems of the Philosophy of Law that arise in the context of the discussed thesis of the necessary connection between law and morality. Starting from two closely linked examples: human dignity and extreme injustice, the author will argue that such a dialogue of traditions is possible, particularly between post-positivism or legal non-positivism and natural law theory, although not exclusively. Furthermore, he will also argue that this dialogue is lightening if sufficient reasons are found to support the existence and validity of some indispensable legal principles —reasonably compatible with the diversity and contingency of law itself— based on equal human dignity. The examination of these theses will also allow us to conclude that post legal positivism faces similar or even greater difficulties than natural law theory for its justification, and to pose some questions to the other traditions.