A Dynamic Behavior Verification Method for Composite Smart Contracts Based on Model Checking

Abstract

A composite smart contract can execute smart contracts that may belong to other owners or companies through external calls, bringing more security challenges to blockchain applications. Traditional static verification methods are inadequate for analyzing the dynamic execution of these contracts, resulting in misjudgment and omission issues. Therefore, this paper proposes a model checking approach based on dynamic behavior that verifies the security and business logic of composite smart contracts. Utilizing automata, the method models contracts, users, attackers, and extracts properties, focusing on six types of common security vulnerabilities. A thorough case study and experimental evaluation demonstrate the method’s efficiency in identifying vulnerabilities and ensuring alignment with business requirements. The UPPAAL tool is employed for comprehensive verification, proving its effectiveness in enhancing smart contract security.

Keywords

• smart contracts
• model checking
• solidity
• UPPAAL
• formal methods
• security vulnerabilities