Avicenna’s Arguments against Metempsychosis

Abstract

Metempsychosis is the concept of the transmigration of a human or animal soul into another human, animal, plant, or even an inanimate object. The theory of metempsychosis poses a challenge to the belief in resurrection (Maʿād), making it necessary to reject metempsychosis before proving Maʿād. Avicenna presents two arguments against metempsychosis. The first argument, found in numerous works, rejects metempsychosis on the grounds that it requires the union of two souls within a single body. Avicenna alludes to the second argument in his Al-Isharat wa al-Tanbihat but postpones its full explanation to another unspecified work. Nasir al-Din al-Tusi, Fakhr al-Din Razi, and Qutb al-Din Razi have proposed different interpretations of this second argument. The variations in interpretation revolve around the number of implications Avicenna expressed for this modus ponendo and his reasons for rejecting them. Among these interpretations, only Qutb al-Din Razi's aligns more closely with Avicenna's original words. In the other two interpretations, there are either deficiencies or excesses compared to Avicenna's work.

Keywords

• metempsychosis
• maʿād
• avicenna
• soul
• bodily temperament