Asymmetric Information Dissemination in Double-Layer Networks Helps Explain the Emergence of Cooperation

Abstract

This paper proposes a double-layer network game model based on asymmetric information, hoping to explore the impact of asymmetric information dissemination on the evolution of cooperation. The model assumes that agents in heterogeneous states play the Prisoner’s Dilemma game in the network’s physical layer, and heterogeneous information disseminates asymmetrically in the virtual layer of the network. Through mean-field theory analysis and Monte Carlo experiments, we found that the dissemination of asymmetric information significantly impacts cooperation. The positive information generated by the defector can promote cooperation in the short term but will hinder cooperation in the long term. Positive information generated by cooperators can promote cooperation in the long run. The system’s final state depends on the relative intensity of the two kinds of information dissemination. Asymmetric information dissemination can promote cooperation because heterogeneous information has distinct dissemination intensities, which makes the number of active agents around the agents different. The positive information generated by cooperators can attract more active agents in the long run, thus obtaining more payoffs, making the agents in the system tend to cooperate. The positive information generated by defectors produces more silent neighbours in the long run, thus reducing the overall payoffs, which makes the agents in the system tend to defect. This paper provides a new explanation for the emergence of cooperation, which helps expand the existing research field.

Keywords

• Evolutionary computation
• cooperative systems
• complexity theory
• social engineering