Zbornik Radova Pravnog Fakulteta u Nišu (Jan 2014)
The latitude of logic in legal hermeneutics
Abstract
Legal hermeneutics (the interpretation of law] has always taken a highly significant place in general hermeneutics. The interpretation of laws involves an intricate task of determining the real meaning or rationale of legal norms. Considering the complexity of this goal, the most frequent classification of legal hermeneutics is based on the interpretation instruments. In traditional theory, the most widely recognized instruments for the interpretation of legal norms are language, logic, legal system, history and purpose of a legal norm. Under the influence of general analytic philosophy, the particular interest in language as the basic instrument for the interpretation of law may be found in mid-20th century. The interest in the language of law is closely related to the study of legal logic and legal argumentation. In theory, there is no dispute about the logical interpretation in a narrow sense which is based on drawing true conclusions by applying the basic rule of formal reasoning. Yet, it has given a head start to argumentation as 'a problem-based reasoning skill' which provides answers to the questions raised in contentious cases. Argumentation is closely associated with the dialectic method of reasoning (which has been widely recognized since the Ancient Greece], where conclusions are based on probable premises. One of the most significant goals of the argumentation theory is to locate the sources or common grounds for developing arguments; these basic argumentative patterns are generally known as 'topoi' or 'loci, sedes argumentorum'. On the other hand, 'topica' is part of rhetoric art dealing with the theoretical explanation of the basic argumentative patterns (topoi] and how they are structured, including the location of new topoi and arguments. The most significant proponents of the topical reasoning are Chaïm Perelman and Theodor Viehweg. Perelman relates topical reasoning to judicial reasoning and considers that specific legal topoi may lead to the perception of law as ars aequi et boni. According to Viehweg, 'topica' is a technique of problem-based reasoning which is fully different from the deductive-systematic reasoning. Interpretation or construing meaning is part of 'topica' which enables flexibility of practical argumentation by expanding and reducing the catalogue of 'topoi'. In legal hermeneutics, the new quality of argumentation and topical reasoning stems from the fact that the classical methods of interpretation are substituted by a far more extensive number of arguments (Giovanni Tarello recognizes 15 legal topoi and Gerhard Struck as many as 64 legal topoi]. It ultimately points out to the creative role of the interpreter's rhetoric research and decision-making processes.
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