A back‐to‐back coordination‐based learning scheme for deceiving reactive jammers in distributed networks

Abstract

Abstract Reactive jammers select jamming strategies according to the users’ responses; thus, conventional anti‐jamming methods such as frequency hopping are inadequate to defeat the jamming attack. In this article, the authors propose a novel uncoupled deception scheme to trap the reactive jammer into attacking a decoy channel in distributed networks. Specifically, the authors design a multi‐functional network utility for every user to mislead the jammer with a minimum energy consumption while achieving the highest network throughput. Based on the network utility, the anti‐jamming problem is formulated as an exact potential game such that the existence of Nash equilibrium can be guaranteed theoretically. The authors further propose a back‐to‐back coordination‐based learning algorithm to reach the optimal channel selection and power adaption in a non‐cooperative way. To alleviate the lack of mutual information exchange, the back‐to‐back coordination mechanism derives all users to deceive the jammer by inferring others’ strategies based on a shared belief. Simulation results show that the proposed algorithm yields higher network throughput and efficiency‐cost ratio compared to the state‐of‐the‐art cooperative schemes.

Keywords

• distribution networks
• game theory
• jamming
• back‐to‐back coordination
• deceptive anti‐jamming
• distributed networks