L’intentionnalité dans la Théorie de la science de Bolzano. Éléments d’une reconstruction.

Abstract

Probably since Husserl’s Prolegomena, it is usually claimed that Bolzano aimed to develop a theory of presentations and propositions in which these are considered to be logical entities in their own right. Not only are they independent from actual acts of thinking, but they also are the only carriers of the properties dealt with in logic (truth, falsity, objectuality, etc.). However, the importance of this position in the economy of Bolzano’s thought, often characterized as logical realism (Morscher), tends to downplay other aspects of his work. Without contradicting his logical realism, these aspects show that the Bohemian philosopher was also offering an account of the intentional relation between the agent and the logical entities. In this article, I propose a reconstruction of the means used by Bolzano to elucidate this relation. First, I discuss the case of objectless presentations, focussing especially on the intentional nature of some of their characterizations. In the second part of the article, I examine his conception of the relation between the judgment and the proposition. In the last part of the paper, I propose an account of the general principles of his conception of meaning intentions underlying his semiotics. Taken as a whole, these three cases show that intentionality is not an epiphenomenon in the Theory of Science, as one may believe when taking Husserl’s interpretation of Bolzano as a starting point. Rather, I argue that it is a constitutive part of Bolzano’s enterprise.

Keywords

• Bolzano
• presentation
• proposition
• judgment
• truth
• meaning