Between Physics and Metaphysics — on Determinism, Arrow of Time and Causality

Abstract

Contemporary physics, with two Einstein’s theories (called “relativity” what can be interpreted erroneously) and with Heisenberg’s principle of indeterminacy (better: “lack of epistemic determinism”) are frequently interpreted as a removal of the causality from physics. We argue that this is wrong. There are no indications in physics, either classical or quantum, that physical laws are indeterministic, on the ontological level. On the other hand, both classical and quantum physics are, practically, indeterministic on the epistemic level: there are no means for us to predict the detailed future of the world. Additionally, essentially all physical principles, including the arrow of time and the conservation of energy could be, hypothetically, violated (with some exceptions in the world of heavier quarks, and probably, the cosmological arrow of time). However, in contrast to Hume’s skepticism, we have no experimental evidence that the causality can be removed or even “hung on” in any case. The text contains some didactical-like issues, as well.

Keywords

• quantum mechanics
• determinism
• causality
• classical physics