Teorie principála a agenta a její využití při popisu vztahu volič–zástupce

Central European Political Studies Review. 2017;19(3-4):215-242 DOI 10.5817/CEPSR.2017.34.215

 

Journal Homepage

Journal Title: Central European Political Studies Review

ISSN: 1213-2691 (Print); 1212-7817 (Online)

Publisher: Masaryk University

Society/Institution: International Institute of Political Science

LCC Subject Category: Political science: Political theory

Country of publisher: Czechia

Language of fulltext: English, Czech, Slovak

Full-text formats available: PDF, HTML

 

AUTHORS

Jaroslava Pospíšilová

EDITORIAL INFORMATION

Double blind peer review

Editorial Board

Instructions for authors

Time From Submission to Publication: 20 weeks

 

Abstract | Full Text

This review article is focused on the rising framework of principal-agent analysis in political science. It aims to map the most influential studies and answer the question of whether this concept is adequate to describe the quality of the relationship between voters and their representatives. It is obvious that using the principal-agent framework leads to oversimplification. The economic theory of democracy is not a new model; nevertheless, using the game theoretic approach requires several adjustments. The adaptation of the main premises of the concept to the political reality should open new research questions with respect to the voter–elected officials relationship. Most principal–agent studies in empirical political science are focused on all links in the delegation chain but the first one. In my opinion, the link between voters and their representatives in a democracy is the fundamental one. Describing it using the tools of principal-agent theory could help scholars better understand current changes in the structure of political parties and voter behaviour.