Developing correlation indices to identify coordinated cyber-attacks on power grids

Abstract

Increasing reliance on Information and Communication Technology exposes the power grid to cyber-attacks. In particular, Coordinated Cyber-Attacks (CCAs) are considered highly threatening and difficult to defend against, because they (i) possess higher disruptiveness by integrating greater resources from multiple attack entities, and (ii) present heterogeneous traits in cyber-space and the physical grid by hitting multiple targets to achieve the attack goal. Thus, and as opposed to independent attacks, whose severity is limited by the power grid's redundancy, CCAs could inflict disastrous consequences, such as blackouts. In this study, the authors propose a method to develop Correlation Indices to defend against CCAs on static control applications. These proposed indices relate the targets of CCAs with attack goals on the power grid. Compared to related works, the proposed indices present the benefits of deployment simplicity and are capable of detecting more sophisticated attacks, such as measurement attacks. The method is demonstrated using measurement attacks against Security Constrained Economic Dispatch.

Keywords

• power generation dispatch
• power system security
• security of data
• power generation economics
• power grids
• power engineering computing
• correlation indices
• coordinated cyber-attacks
• power grid
• increasing reliance
• CCAs
• multiple attack entities
• cyber-space
• physical grid
• multiple targets
• attack goal
• independent attacks
• sophisticated attacks
• measurement attacks
• information and communication technology
• static control applications
• security constrained economic dispatch