Revista de Filosofia (Sep 2017)
On the north sea shore
Abstract
A thought makes truth turn in some given way on how things are. What it thus does decomposes in partial doings of this. For example, making truth turn on whether Sid is sober may decompose into making truth turn on which ways Sid is, and on which objects are sober. If we assume that a thought decomposed in just one such way. Such, then, would be a thought’s essential structure. That idea might then apply as follows. To hold a thought true one must first grasp it. To grasp it one must each element of its essential structure. If, say, those elements are making truth turn on Sid and making it turn on who is sober, then one must grasp what it would be for something to be Sid (and for something to be sober). The working assumption here is false. But in any case this application is mistaken. Or so this essay argues.
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