Call Me Maybe: Using Dynamic Protocol Switching to Mitigate Denial-of-Service Attacks on VoIP Systems

Abstract

Voice over IP is quickly becoming the industry standard voice communication service. While using an IP-based method of communication has many advantages, it also comes with a new set of challenges; voice networks are now accessible to a multitude of internet-based attackers from anywhere in the world. One of the most prevalent threats to a VoIP network are Denial-of-Service attacks, which consume network bandwidth to congest or disable the communication service. This paper looks at the current state of research into the mitigation of these attacks against VoIP networks, to see if the mechanisms in place are enough. A new framework is proposed titled the “Call Me Maybe” framework, combining elements of latency monitoring with dynamic protocol switching to mitigate DoS attacks against VoIP systems. Research conducted around routing VoIP over TCP rather than UDP is integrated into the proposed design, along with a latency monitoring mechanism to detect when the service is under attack. Data gathered from a Cisco Packet Tracer simulation was used to evaluate the effectiveness of the solution. The gathered results have shown that there is a statistically significant improvement in the response times of voice traffic when using the “Call Me Maybe” framework in a network experiencing a DoS attack. The research and findings therefore aim to provide a contribution to the enhancement of the security of VoIP and future IP-based voice communication systems.

Keywords

• Voice-over-IP (VoIP)
• Denial-of-Service (DoS)
• Transmission Control Protocol (TCP)