Evolution Mechanism of Public–Private Partnership Project Trust from the Perspective of the Supply Chain

Abstract

In the public–private partnership (PPP) supply chain, trust serves as the foundation for collaboration between investment companies and suppliers. However, due to many uncertain factors, the evolution of trust remains a “black box” phenomenon. In order to analyze the impact of the evolution of trust in the PPP supply chain on investment companies and suppliers’ strategic choices, and promote the healthy and sustainable development of PPP supply chain projects, this paper establishes a trust evolutionary game model, which analyzes the evolutionary paths under different scenarios and explores the impact of parameters on the cooperative strategies of participants. The findings indicate that trust asymmetry or an increase in trust can facilitate investment companies and suppliers to opt for positive cooperation strategies. Furthermore, both parties’ strategies are less influenced by their initial willingness and more by trust degree. The moral risk coefficient and information asymmetry coefficient have a negative effect on the cooperative strategies, with the moral risk coefficient of investment companies exhibiting a more significant impact on the entire cooperation process. Moreover, both parties can only choose positive strategies when the information asymmetry coefficient is low. This study holds significant implications for promoting cooperation, enhancing contract performance, safeguarding the interests of all parties, and increasing cooperation satisfaction.

Keywords

• supply chain
• PPP project
• cooperation mechanism
• stakeholder approach
• trust
• evolutionary game