Contemporary Chinese Political Economy and Strategic Relations: An International Journal (Apr 2022)

Reading beyond the Lines of Xi Jinping’s Speech: China’s Leadership and Its Domestic Calculus over the Disputed Spratly Islands

  • Noor Hasifah Abdul Rashid,
  • Muhammad Danial Azman,
  • Zarina Othman,
  • Khadijah Md Khalid

Journal volume & issue
Vol. 8, no. 1
pp. 139 – 198

Abstract

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The past and recent developments of the disputed Spratly Islands have alarmed the international community due to China’s constant increased presence with its sophisticated military infrastructures over reclaimed lands of the Spratly Islands. Considering international arbitrators favoured the Philippines in the 2016’s verdict and the July 2021’s incident of China’s military incursions nearby Malaysia’s Sabah maritime border, this article seeks to argue an increased alarming security dilemma among Southeast Asian claimant against China over the Spratly Islands. This article uses Social Constructivism approaches and illuminates social interaction processes between agency and structure or between China premier and state bureaucrat and within the intersection of domestic and international dimensions of China. Unlike conventional International Relations (IR) theories, Social Constructivism provides merits of Structuration1 approach to appreciate intricate social relations between China premier and its domestic calculus in determining China’s behaviour over the disputed Spratly Islands. In return, Structuration allows nuanced reading beyond the lines in matching President Xi Jinping’s verbatim intention through China’s behaviour in the disputed Spratly Islands. When reading China in the disputed Spratly Islands, it is appropriate to ask this question: does leadership affect a nation's behaviour and its domestic calculus? In a way to understand this, the Structuration approach is applied. Through the lens of the Structuration approach, this article examines the nexus between the leader as “agency” and the state’s institutions as “structure” by emphasising Xi’s state leadership and his social interactions over several institutions with the China’s state system, illuminating a likely pattern of China's actions over the disputed Spratly Islands. By linking the early days of Xi’s speeches to the present plausible behaviour of China in the disputed Spratly Islands, this article illuminates the ascendency of highly and increasingly unlikely positive images of Xi’s construction of China, even among the existing partners of the Belt and Road Initiatives (BRIs) as well as Southeast Asian claimant states over the disputed Spratly Islands.

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