How can the collaborative participation of regulators, whistleblowers, and parties effectively promote rumor management in public health emergencies?

Abstract

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To effectively address the mental health risks associated with public health emergencies, it is crucial to actively manage rumors. This study explores the dynamic evolutionary process of rumor diffusion and its collaborative governance in public health emergencies. A game-theoretic model is constructed, involving three main actors: regulators, parties involved in public health emergencies (PIPHE), and whistle-blowers. The behaviors and game outcomes of each party are analyzed, and the effectiveness and feasibility of the model are validated through numerical simulations. The findings of this study reveal that various factors, such as regulatory costs, penalty income, reputation damage for regulators; image loss, reputation enhancement, penalty expenditure for PIPHE; and time costs, social responsibility, and reward income for whistle-blowers, all influence the behavioral choices and game equilibrium of each party. Optimization strategies for rumor governance are proposed in this study, including enhancing the sense of responsibility and capability among regulators, increasing transparency and credibility among PIPHE, and encouraging and protecting the participation of whistle-blowers. This study provides a comprehensive analytical framework for rumor governance in public health emergencies, contributing to improving the governance of public health emergencies and maintaining online public health orders for social sustainability.

Keywords

• public health emergencies
• rumor management
• collaborative governance
• social sustainability
• evolutionary games