Quantum Resistance Saber-Based Group Key Exchange Protocol for IoT

Abstract

Quantum computing poses a threat on current cryptography methods, prompting initiatives such as the U.S. National Institute for Standards and Technology (NIST) standardization process toward developing post-quantum cryptographic tools. This process concentrates on deploying “key encapsulation mechanisms” and “signature schemes”, mainly focusing on Group Authenticated key exchange (GAKE), which is crucial for secure group communication while ensuring authentication is immune to quantum attacks. Despite various two-party key exchange designs adaptable for group key exchange protocols with multiple parties, experts face challenges in secure group interactions in a post-quantum environment due to the lack of such group protocols solutions. Addressing the necessity of secure group communication in IoTs, we proposed a GAKE protocol. This paper presents its design and implementation secure under QROM; we compared our initial findings on the “Saber-based GAKE” with a Kyber-based GAKE implementation named “Complied Kyber” proposed by Pablos, focusing on IoTs. Our findings show better efficiency than “Compiled Kyber” regarding overall communication duration, especially when involving up to 2000 participants in group communication. Furthermore, thorough investigation and calculations confirm the Saber-GAKE protocol’s interoperability with IoT contexts. The protocol has worthy computational efficiency, with execution speeds of 0.064 ms on ARM Cortex-M4 and 1.56 ms on ARM Cortex-M0 systems. The memory use is well below the allowed limits, with 50.86 KB on Cortex-M4 and 35.84 KB on Cortex-M0. The performance data validate that the Saber-GAKE protocol can effectively and safely function on IoT devices with limited resources, offering strong protection against quantum computing assaults.

Keywords

• ARM Cortex
• group authenticated key exchange
• GAKE
• IoTs
• quantum-resistance
• Saber