Науковий вісник Ужгородського національного університету. Серія Право (Jan 2024)

Striking a balance: the interplay of CJEU rulings and international human rights obligation with national constitutional identities

  • L. M. Deshko,
  • V. S. Boiko

DOI
https://doi.org/10.24144/2307-3322.2023.80.1.17
Journal volume & issue
Vol. 1, no. 80

Abstract

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The article examines approaches to the interaction of decisions of the Court of the European Union (CJEU) and international obligations in the field of human rights with the constitutional identity of states. Attention is focused on the concepts of “national identity” and “constitutional identity”, their relationship, and the introduction of the concept of “national identity” into the European legal order after the signing of the Maastricht Treaty (1993). Attention is drawn to the fact that the primary law of the EU does not contain the concept of “constitutional identity”, but this term is widely used in the decisions of the constitutional courts of several EU member states. In these decisions, the constitutional courts raised the issue of the protection of the constitution and constitutionality in the EU member state given the harmonization of legislation and/ or ultra vires decisions. The article notes that the concept of constitutional identity is broad, it covers the historical, political, cultural, and legal identity of the state, as well as the connection of national law with the international and autonomous legal order of the EU. The idea of constitutional identity is dynamic and constantly evolving due to the continuous development of the states themselves. The analysis of various approaches to this interaction based on the German Federal Constitutional Court, Hungarian Constitutional Court, and Italian Constitutional Court was carried out. It is noted that the interaction of CJEU rulings with constitutional identities is based on the principle of primacy of the EU law, and international human rights obligations are based on the conventional feature of the “obligation of uniform interpretation” and universal standards while ignoring the constitutional tradition of the states. It means that CJEU judgments have a higher legal force than national court judgments, while international human rights obligations should become precedents for subsequent national court judgments, not lowering the national standards of human rights protection.

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