Gobierno de partidos y designación de ministros en Uruguay, 1985-2024

Abstract

Objective/Context: The article analyzes the partisan nature of ministers in Uruguay (96 % of the total) during the period 1985–2024, based on the institutional and political constraints of cabinet appointments. Given that the president has moderate legislative powers, nominations are used to build majorities capable of approving government initiatives and preventing the opposition from censuring ministers in Parliament. As the political system operates based on the logic of the party government model, the article explores the consequences of its application by analyzing the behavior of the ruling party’s caucus in a sample of ministerial interpellations conducted in Parliament. Methodology: The research is a case study based on statistical analysis of original data. The main hypothesis considers four independent variables (size of the president’s legislative contingent, party cohesion, type of government, and evolution of the government period) and a series of control variables. Conclusions: The study confirms that Uruguayan presidents make strategic use of ministerial appointments, based on the assumption that the relationship between powers functions as a typical party government model, similar to that observed in parliamentary regimes. Presidents appoint high-ranking partisan ministers when they have support in Parliament and the party is strongly cohesive. They appoint mid- and low-ranking partisan ministers when the president forms coalitions and when the party is less cohesive. Finally, they prefer new or discreet partisan ministers when the president loses his coalition or during the last years of the mandate. Originality: It analyzes the appointment of ministers in Uruguay under a presidential system that, despite not having excessive legislative powers, resembles the typical party government model of parliamentary regimes.

Keywords

• ministerial cabinets
• political parties
• presidentialism
• uruguay