RISK TRANSMISSION AND CONTROL OF PORT-HINTERLAND SERVICE NETWORK: FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF PREVENTIVE INVESTMENT AND GOVERNMENT SUBSIDIES

Abstract

The increase in risk prevention investments in the port-hinterland service network (PHSN) effectively enhances the network’s ability to resist risks and improve the sustainability and stability of ocean transportation. Based on the construction of the PHSN risk prevention investment utility model, the equilibrium strategy, the related characteristics of each participant in the complementary networks and the complete network are analyzed. Similarly, the subsidy policy of the government under the utility maximization of the whole service network is studied. We further propose new types of subsidy strategies based on the key nodes and key groups given the resources available and the subsidy efficiency constraints imposed, while also validating the advantages of this method based on a case analysis. The results indicate that the (1) equilibrium risk prevention investment is closely related to the Katz-Bonacich centrality, network interaction intensity, cost of unit risk prevention investment and competition intensity; (2) an undifferentiated subsidy strategy cannot improve the risk prevention effectiveness of the whole network; (3) the subsidy strategy based on key nodes and key groups effectively improves the risk prevention efficiency; and (4) the subsidy strategy of key groups is superior to the subsidy strategy of key nodes. Accordingly, the results of this study provide a reference for participants and managers in the PHSN when making risk prevention investment decisions.

Keywords

• port-hinterland service network
• risk prevention
• network game
• subsidy policy