Reconstruction and Critical Analysis of Avicenna's General Argument in Proving the Existence of Soul

Abstract

The primary focus of this research is the critical analysis of Avicenna's argument for demonstrating the existence of the soul in living beings. The objective is to reconstruct this argument and expose its inadequacy in proving the presence of a soul in plants. Avicenna's argument, as presented in the opening sections of the 'Book of Soul' in his al-Shifa, revolves around establishing the existence of souls in all living entities, equating it with proving the form of the species in all bodies. Avicenna asserts that the five essential characteristics—sense, voluntary movement, nutrition, growth, and reproduction—do not originate from the physical form of objects. Therefore, he posits the existence of a source, referred to as the soul, in certain bodies. This soul is considered the form of their species or similar to it, serving as the origin of these five characteristics. However, Avicenna's argument, grounded in inference through the best explanation, remains incomplete due to a lack of comprehensive exploration of all possible avenues and neglecting potential objections. The authors initially reconstruct Avicenna's argument by drawing on interpretations by Nasir al-Din al-Tūsi and Sadr al-Mutallahin. Subsequently, after highlighting the limitations of these two interpretations, they offer their independent reconstruction, considering all possible divisions. Nevertheless, this argument falls short in proving the existence of a soul in plants, primarily due to objections regarding certain invalidated physical foundations that reject temperament as the source of movement.

Keywords

• soul
• proof of soul
• form of the species
• inference through the best explanation
• cognition
• avicenna