The logical principles of hermeneutics

Abstract

This article constitutes the first part of a more extensive work on hermeneutics and existential philosophy. It’s articulated as an analysis of some central statements of Truth and Method of Gadamer and both Being and Time and Contributions to Philosophy of Heidegger, conducted alternating five different points of view: metaphilosophy, epistemology, philosophy of logic, bio- and cognitive linguistics, and philosophy of language. In the present article I focus on philosophy of logic, with some excursions into philosophy of language. The main objective of the work consists in demonstrating what follows. A general impredicative structure is variously described and commented on in Truth and Method; I argue that it 1) corresponds logically to the intesional Liar-paradox; 2) derives exegetically from Heidegger’s differentiation between ἀλήθεια and truth in λόγος; 3) should be interpreted philosophically as the Hegelian Identity in Difference, despite Gadamer’s intention to avoid dialectic conclusions. Priest showed that the concept of Identity in Difference and the Law of Dialectical Contradiction describe the same structures, imposing a dialetheic lecture. Along this line, I argue, Gadamer’s followers should better present their argument as paraconsistent.

Keywords

• Philosophy of Logic
• Hermeneutics
• Dialectics
• Paradox
• Paraconsistency