Continental Policy of Japan as Seen from France: Indochina Crisis of 1940 and Politicians of the Vichy Regime (Part One)

Abstract

This article deals with little-known aspects of the Indochina crisis of 1940 in Japanese–French relations — Japan’s claims to control and military presence in French Indochina in the summer and autumn of 1940. Ensuring the security and stability of Indochina was at the heart of the French policy towards Japan during all the pre-war years. It was characterized by a willingness to make concessions and compromises, so it was often criticized for “appeasing the aggressor.” The beginning of the war in Europe in September 1939 prompted Japanese military circles to develop new expansion plans in the face of France’s weakening position in East Asia. The military defeat of France in June 1940 prompted Japan to increase pressure on it in order to completely stop the supply of military materials to China and to take control of the execution of these measures. Japan’s strategic goal was to establish control over Indochina. The new authoritarian regime of the French state (the Vichy regime), which replaced the parliamentary regime of the defunct Third Republic, compromised with Japan, taking into account the inequality of forces in the region; therefore, its policy is called the policy of concessions. The author examines the process of shaping French policy and the actions of its main performers: Head of State Philippe Pétain, Minister of Foreign Affairs Paul Baudouin, Ministers of Colonies Albert Rivière and Henri Lémery, Governors-General of Indochina Georges Catroux and Jean Decoux. The article is based on diaries, memoirs, and other testimonies of the actors in combination with the latest research works.

Keywords

• japan
• france
• vichy regime
• indochina
• diplomacy
• colony
• expansion
• security