The Court of Justice's Self-restraint of Reviewing Financial Assistance Conditionality in the Chrysostomides Case

Abstract

(Series Information) European Papers - A Journal on Law and Integration, 2021 6(1), 177-188 | European Forum Insight of 28 May 2021 | (Table of Contents) I. Introduction. - II. Background: the EU Courts and the Euro crisis. - II.1. Ledra: applicability of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU. - II.2. Mallis: no action for annulment of a Eurogroup statement. - III. The Chrysostomides case. - III.1. The judgment of the General Court. - III.2. The judgement of the ECJ. - IV. Implications for legal protection against financial assistance conditionality. - V. Conclusions. | (Abstract) In the Chrysostomides case (joined cases C-597/18 P, C-598/18 P, C-603/18 P and C-604/18 P Council v Chrysostomides Co. and Others ECLI:EU:C:2020:1028), the Court of Justice (ECJ) confirmed its previous finding that the Eurogroup has only an informal and intergovernmental nature. Building on the cases Ledra and Mallis, the ECJ finally denied the respective possibilities of EU legal protection against acts and conduct of the Eurogroup. Moreover, the ECJ denied the binding nature of art. 2(6)(b) of Council Decision (EU) 2013/236, a decision with which the conditionality of the macro-economic adjustment programme had been brought under the auspices of EU law. As a consequence, the Eurogroup's acts and conduct as well as conditionality measures cannot be reviewed on the EU level.

Keywords

• financial assistance conditionality
• eurogroup
• accountability
• action for damages
• economic and monetary union
• cyprus