Nature Communications (Feb 2024)

Bayesian evaluation of diverging theories of episodic and affective memory distortions in dysphoria

  • Sascha B. Duken,
  • Liza Keessen,
  • Herbert Hoijtink,
  • Merel Kindt,
  • Vanessa A. van Ast

DOI
https://doi.org/10.1038/s41467-024-45203-4
Journal volume & issue
Vol. 15, no. 1
pp. 1 – 23

Abstract

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Abstract People suffering from dysphoria retrieve autobiographical memories distorted in content and affect, which may contribute to the aetiology and maintenance of depression. However, key memory difficulties in dysphoria remain elusive because theories disagree how memories of different valence are altered. Here, we assessed the psychophysiological expression of affect and retrieved episodic detail while participants with dysphoria (but without a diagnosed mental illness) and participants without dysphoria relived positive, negative, and neutral memories. We show that participants with dysphoria retrieve positive memories with diminished episodic detail and negative memories with enhanced detail, compared to participants without dysphoria. This is in line with negativity bias but not overgeneral memory bias theories. According to confirmatory analyses, participants with dysphoria also express diminished positive affect and enhanced negative affect when retrieving happy memories, but exploratory analyses suggest that this increase in negative affect may not be robust. Further confirmatory analyses showed that affective responses to memories are not related to episodic detail and already present during the experience of new emotional events. Our results indicate that affective memory distortions may not emerge from mnemonic processes but from general distortions in positive affect, which challenges assumptions of memory theories and therapeutics. Protocol registration: The Stage 1 protocol for this Registered Report was accepted in principle on the 18rd of March 2021. The protocol, as accepted by the journal, can be found at https://doi.org/10.6084/m9.figshare.14605374.v1 .